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Abstract. The conventional wisdom has always been that users should
refrain from entering their sensitive data (such as usernames, passwords,
and credit card numbers) into http(or white) pages, but they can enter
these data into https (or yellow) pages. Unfortunately, this assumption
is not valid as it became clear recently that, through human mistakes or
Phishing or Pharming attacks, a displayed yellow page may not be the
same one that the user has intended to request in the ﬁrst place. In this
paper, we propose to add a third class of secure web pages called brown
pages. We show that brown pages are more secure than yellow pages
especially in face of human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks.
Thus users can enter their sensitive data into brown pages without worry.
We present a login protocol, called the Transport Login Protocol or TLP
for short. An https web page that is displayed on the browser is classiﬁed
brown by the browser if and only if this web page has been called into
the browser either through TLP or from within another brown page that
had been called earlier into the browser through TLP.
1 Introduction
When a user needs to display a web page on his browser, the user follows any
one of four direction rules, described below, to request that his browser calls the
page and displays it on the screen. If the requested page is an (insecure) http
page, then the browser calls the page and displays it without any ﬁrm guarantee
that the displayed page is the one that the user has requested. On the other
hand, if the requested page is a (secure) https page, then the browser displays
the page only after it has authenticated that the page is the one that the user
has requested. Unfortunately, as described below, the authentication procedure
is vulnerable to human mistakes, by the user, and to Phishing and Pharming
attacks [1], by adversarial web sites. And so it is possible that the displayed page
may not be the one requested by the user after all.
The user may not mind that the displayed page is diﬀerent from the page that
he has requested for two reasons. First, both the displayed page and the page
that the user has requested have similar graphics and colors and the user may
not notice that the displayed page is actually not the one that he has requested
even in the presence of security indicators [2]. Second, the user may notice that
the displayed page is not the one that he has requested, but he may believe that
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the displayed page is a legitimate redirection that was requested by the page
that he has requested. In any case, the user may proceed to enter some sensitive
data, such as his credit card number, into the displayed page which may happen
to be an adversarial page.
This paper is dedicated to prevent these scenarios from occurring. Towards
this end, we propose to introduce a new class of https web pages, which we refer
to as brown pages. As discussed below, brown pages are secure against human
mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks. Thus, when a user requests that
his browser calls and displays an https page and then the browser displays the
page and classiﬁes it brown, the user knows that the displayed page is indeed
the one that he has requested and so he can proceed to enter his sensitive data
into it.
In order for the browser to be able to classify a called https page brown, the
browser needs to call this page through a login protocol that is completely secure
against human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks. In this paper, we
present and discuss the design and implementation of such a login protocol.
2 Attack Scenarios
In this section, we describe three attack scenarios, caused by human mistakes or
Phishing or Pharming attacks[3,4]. In each one of these scenarios, a user intends
to call into his browser a particular https page, but he ends up calling a wrong
https page into his browser.
1. Human Mistakes
A user intends to enter the URL https://www.amazon.com into the URL
box of his browser. But he enters the wrong URL https://www.anazon.com
by mistake.
2. Phishing Attacks
A user receives an email that urges the user to click on a link described as
leading to the web site https://www.amazon.com. By clicking on this link,
the user ends up in the wrong web site https://www.anazon.com.
3. Pharming Attacks
For the convenience of its users, the web site https://www.amazon.com
allows its users to call the web site using the alternative insecure URL
http://www.amazon.com. Now, the DNS of a user can be manipulated so
that when the user uses this insecure URL to request the web site, the user’s
DNS directs the request to an adversarial web site that redirects the user’s
browser to the wrong web site https://www.anazon.com.
In each one of these three scenarios, the user intended to call into his browser the
web site https://www.amazon.com, but he ends up calling the wrong web site
https://www.anazon.com. The user does not notice the switch, from https://
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similar logos, graphics, and colors, and maybe similar URLs. Thus the user
proceeds to enter his sensitive information (such as username, password, or credit
card numbers) into the wrong web site. The objective of this paper is to outline
a proposal to counter these three attack scenarios.
One method to counter these scenarios is to advise the user to be careful and
check the URL box of the displayed https web page on his browser before he
enters his sensitive data into the displayed web page. However, it is very diﬃcult
for a user to remember and follow this advice every time he requests an https
web page.
A second method to counter these scenarios is to make the browser check,
before it displays an https web page, that this page is indeed the one that the
user wants. Unfortunately, the browser can not tell whether or not the user wants
the web page whose URL is in the URL box.
The method that we adopt in this paper to counter these scenarios is as
follows. Browser B of user U displays an https page from a web site S when and
only when the following three conditions hold.
1. User U has requested the page.
2. Site S has veriﬁed that sometime in the past user U has registered and stored
his login data in site S.
3. Browser B has veriﬁed that sometime in the past user U has registered and
stored his login data in site S.
If any one of these three conditions does not hold, then the browser of user U
refuses to display the requested page. The correctness of this method is based
on the reasonable assumption that each web site in which user U registers is a
legitimate, rather than an adversarial, site. Next, we argue that this method can
counter the above three scenarios.
Consider the ﬁrst scenario. If user U intends to request the web site https://
www.amazon.com,butbymistakerequeststhewebsitehttps://www.anazon.com,
then only one of two outcomes is possible. The most likely outcome is that user U
has not registeredin the web site https://www.anazon.comand sothe browserof
user U will not display the web page. The second outcome is that user U has reg-
i s t e r e di nt h ew e bs i t ehttps://www.anazon.comand so the browser will display
the legitimate web page of this site and user U will notice that the displayed page
is not the one that he wants.
Now consider the second and third scenarios. In these scenarios, the web site
https://www.anazon.comis an adversarial site and so user U has not registered
in it. Thus, browser of user U will not display the web page.
3 Countering the Attack Scenarios
In this section, we outline our proposal to modify the browser and some web
sites in order to counter the attack scenarios, caused by human mistakes and
Phishing and Pharming attacks, discussed in the previous section. Our proposal
consists of three parts.236 T. Choi et al.
1. White, Yellow, and Brown Pages
We propose to modify the browser so that the browser classiﬁes each dis-
played http web page as white, and classiﬁes each displayed https web page
as either yellow or brown. As described below, a user should regard each
white page as insecure, each yellow page as mildly secure (which means
that the page is vulnerable to human mistakes and Phishing and Pharm-
ing attacks), and each brown page as highly secure (which means that the
page is secure against human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks).
2. A New Login Protocol
We also propose to add a new login protocol to the browser and to some web
sites that need to be (extra) secure against human mistakes and Phishing
and Pharming attacks. We call this new login protocol the Transport Login
Protocol or TLP for short. When a user invokes TLP on his browser and
requests the browser to call a web page on a speciﬁed web site, the following
three steps are executed. First, the browser and the speciﬁed web site use
TLP to establish mutual authentication between each other. Second, if the
mutual authentication between the browser and the web site succeeds, then
the web site redirects the browser to an https web page. Third, the browser
calls the secure web page and, upon receiving it, the browser assigns it a
brown classiﬁcation and displays it to the user.
3. Classiﬁcation of Web Pages
The modiﬁed browser assigns a classiﬁcation, white, yellow, or brown, to
each displayed web page, depending on how this page has been called into
the browser in the ﬁrst place. Thus the same displayed https page can be
assigned a yellow classiﬁcation if it is called into the browser one way, and
assigned a brown classiﬁcation if it is called into the browser another way.
We adopt the following classiﬁcation rules.
(a) Any http page, that is called into the browser, is classiﬁed white by the
browser.
(b) Any https page, that is called into the browser using our login protocol
TLP, is classiﬁed brown by the browser.
(c) Any https page, that is called into the browser using the TLS protocol[5],
is either classiﬁed yellow if this page is called from within a displayed
white or yellow page, or classiﬁed brown if this page is called from within
a displayed brown page.
When the browser displays a web page, the browser makes its classiﬁcation of
the displayed page clear to the user by choosing an appropriate background
color for the URL box. If the displayed page is white (or yellow or brown re-
spectively), then the background color for the URL box is white (or yellow or
brown respectively). Note that the current browser already supports white and
yellow classiﬁcations of web pages. So the main contributions of this project are
merely the addition of brown classiﬁcations and the introduction of the new login
protocol TLP which can be used in calling brown web pages into the browser.Pharewell to Phishing 237
(Recently, a green classiﬁcation of https web pages has been introduced to dis-
tinguish those https pages that have extended validation certiﬁcates[6]. Clearly
some green pages, like yellow pages, can still be adversarial, and can still be
used in launching Phishing and Pharming attacks as described above. Hence-
forth, when we refer to yellow pages, we do mean yellow or green pages.)
The policy for entering sensitive data (such as usernames, passwords, and
credit card numbers) into a displayed web page depends on the classiﬁcation of
the displayed page. This policy consists of the following three rules.
1. The White Page Rule
A user should never enter sensitive data into a white page.
2. The Brown Page Rule
A user can enter sensitive data into a brown page.
3. T h eY e l l o wP a g eR u l e
Before a user can enter sensitive data into a yellow page, the user should
have prior knowledge that this data can be entered into this particular page,
and the user should check that the URL box of the displayed page has indeed
the URL of this particular page.
4 The Current Login Protocol
Our login protocol TLP, described in the next section, enjoys a number of nice
features that are not all present in any of the current login protocols. These nice
features are as follows.
1. Immunity to Attacks
When a user U uses TLP to log in a site S, then the login succeeds if and
only if both browser B of user U and site S can verify that user U has reg-
istered (and stored some login data) in site S sometime in the past.
2. No External Servers
All the login data, that are needed by user U to use TLP and successfully
log in site S, are stored on site S. Thus TLP does not need any external
servers to store some of the login data.
3. One-Time Login Data
In TLP, the login data, that are needed by user U to log in site S,a r e
updated after each successful login of U into S. Therefore, if an adversary
somehow steals the login data of user U in site S, then the stolen data
becomes useless after the next login of U into S.
4. Universal Passwords
Each user U needs only to memorize one password P, called the TLP uni-
versal password of U.U s e rU employs his universal password in the TLP238 T. Choi et al.
protocol to log in every web site. No web site S can deduce the TLP uni-
versal password of user U from the login data that user U stores in S or
from the messages exchanged between the browser of U and site S during
the execution of TLP.
5. Standard Cryptography
TLP uses only standard symmetric cryptography and standard secure hash
functions. Thus, every time the standards of symmetric cryptography or of
hash functions are updated, the standards of TLP are updated accordingly.
Next we argue that none of the login protocols, that have been proposed recently,
enjoys all these ﬁve features.
The current login protocol over the web consists of two protocols: the stan-
dard TLS protocol [5] (which is used to authenticate a secure web site by the
browser), and a non-standard password protocol (which is sometimes used to
authenticate the secure web site by the user and to authenticate the user by the
secure web site). As described in Section 2, this login protocol is vulnerable to
human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks, and so it does not enjoy
feature 1.
This login protocol can be strengthened using Site Keys which allow a user to
authenticate the identity of the web site being logged in [7,8]. Unfortunately, Site
Keys can be stolen using Man-In-The-Middle Attacks. Thus the strengthened
protocol still does not enjoy feature 1.
The login protocol SRP[9,10] doest not enjoy any of features 3, 4, and 5 above.
The hash-based protocols, such as [11,12,13,14], enjoy the features 2, 4,
and 5. They also allow the web site to verify that the user has registered in the
site sometimes in the past. Unfortunately, they do no allow the user’s browser to
verify that the user has registered in the site sometime in the past. Thus these
protocols do not enjoy feature 1. Also, some of these protocols, for example [13],
do not enjoy feature 2.
The Passpet system[15] does not enjoy features 2 and 3.
5 The New Login Protocol
Our login protocol TLP is to be executed between browser B of user U and web
site S. Prior to executing TLP, user U needs to have registered with site S by
making its browser B store in S the following tuple of four data items:
(H(U),n ,H (0,n,P,S),H 2(1,n,P,S))
where
U is the username of the user,
B is the browser of user U,
n is a nonce selected at random by browser B,
H is a standard secure hash function,
0 is the character zero,Pharewell to Phishing 239
1 is the character one,
P is the TLP universal password of user U,a n d
S is the domain name of the web site.
Note that H(0,n,P,S) denotes the application of the secure hash function H
to the concatenation of the four data items 0, n, P,a n dS.A l s o ,H2(1,n,P,S)
denotes two consecutive applications of function H to the concatenation of the
four data items 1, n, P,a n dS.A f t e rB stores this tuple in S, B forgets the
tuple completely.
Executing TLP between browser B and site S is intended to achieve ﬁve
objectives.
1. B checks that S is one of the sites where user U had previously registered
(and stored the above tuple of four data items).
2. S checks that user U has entered his universal password P to browser B.
3. Both B and S agree on a symmetric session key that they can use to encrypt
and decrypt their exchanged messages.
4. B selects a new random nonce n and stores the following tuple of four data
items in S in place of the above tuple:
(H(U),n ,H (0,n ,P,S),H 2(1,n ,P,S))
(Therefore, each successful login of browser B into site S causes the tuple of
four data items that B had previously stored in S to be replaced by a new
tuple of four data items also provided by B.)
5. S sends to B the URL of the next https page that B needs to call, using TLS,
along with a cookie identifying user U and testifying that the login procedure
between U’s browser and S, has been successful. When the next https page
is called into B, B assigns this page a brown classiﬁcation. Moreover browser
B assigns any other https page, that is called using TLS from within this
brown page, a brown classiﬁcation .
We adopt the following notation in describing a ﬁeld in a message that is sent
during the execution of TLP.
[expression1] < expression2 >
This notation means that the value of expression1 is used as a symmetric key
to encrypt the value of expression2 before the message is sent.
To start executing TLP between B and S,u s e rU enters three data items,
namely U, P,a n dS, to a local web page named httpl stored in browser B.
Then the execution of TLP proceeds with the following four message exchanges
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B → S : {Hello Message}
U
B ← S : {Hello-Reply Message}
n,[ H(0,n,P,S)] <S N>
B → S : {Login Message}
U,
[H(H2(1,n,P,S),SN)] <H(1,n,P,S),BN,H2(1,n ,P,S) >,
[H(BN,SN)] <n ,H(0,n ,P,S) >
B ← S : {Login-Reply Message}
[H(BN,SN)] < URL of next https web page >,
[H(BN,SN)] < cookie >
The hello message, from B to S, consists of the username of user U who wants
to log in site S. On receiving this message, S fetches the tuple
(H(U),n,H(0,n,P,S),H2(1,n,P,S))
that B h a ds t o r e dp r e v i o u s l yi nS.T h e nS uses the data item H(0,n,P,S)a s
a symmetric key to encrypt a new nonce SN that S selects at random. The
result of the encryption is denoted [H(0,n,P,S)] <S N>and is included in the
hello-reply message that is sent from S to B.
After B receives the hello-reply message, it computes H(0,n,P,S) and uses it
to obtain the nonce SN from the received message. Then, B selects at random
two nonces BN and n, and uses the received SN and the computed BN and
n to construct the login message before sending it to site S.
After S receives the login message, it performs four tasks. First, it checks that
user U has indeed entered its TLP universal password P into browser B. Second,
S extracts the nonce BN from the received message, and now both B and S
know BN and SN.T h i r d ,S stores the tuple:
(H(U),n ,H (0,n ,P,S),H 2(1,n ,P,S)) in place of the earlier tuple.
Fourth, S constructs the login-reply message and sends it to browser B.
After B receives the login-reply message, it concludes that S is one of the
web sites where user U has previously registered. Moreover, B gets the URL of
the https page that B needs to call next using TLS, along with a cookie that
identiﬁes user U and testiﬁes to the fact that the login procedure between U’s
browser and S has been successful.
Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁve steps that are needed for a user to use TLP to log
in a web site in a domain say xyz.com.
1. The user calls a local web page, for convenience named the httpl page, on
his browser and enters his username, his TLP universal password, and the
site address www.xyz.com into this page.
2. The browser uses DNS to get the IP address of site www.xyz.com.
3. The browser and site www.xyz.com execute TLP. At the end, the browser
receives the URL of a web page on site online.xyz.com and a cookie.Pharewell to Phishing 241
Fig.1. Using TLP
4. The browser uses DNS to get the IP address of site online.xyz.com.
5. The browser and site online.xyz.com execute TLS, and the browser gets
the required https page at the end. The browser classiﬁes this page brown.
It also classiﬁes any other https page, that is called using TLS from within
this page, brown.
An argument for the correctness of TLP is presented in [16].
6U s e r I n t e r f a c e o f T L P
As a proof of concept, we have developed a prototype of our Transport Login
Protocol TLP. The browser side of our prototype is developed on the Firefox
browser using the two technologies of Javascript and HTML. The web site side
of our prototype is developed on the Tomcat web server using four technologies:
Java, HTML, the JSP (Java Server Page) technology, and the MySQL database
technology. Note that the MySQL database technology is used to manage the
login tuples, of all users, that are stored in the web site.
We employed standard cryptography in our prototype. In particular, we em-
ployed the Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-1 for secure hash, and employed the
Advanced Encryption Standard AES for symmetric key cryptography.
The guiding principle in our prototype is to ensure that the user never enters
his TLP universal password into a web page that is supplied by a web site, but242 T. Choi et al.
Fig.2. User Interface of TLP
he can enter his password into a local web page that is supplied by his own
browser. It turns out that this principle is hard to fulﬁll in our prototype in the
light of the ”Same Origin Policy” that is adopted by the Javascript technology.
At the end, however, we were able to fulﬁll this principle by designing a novel
user interface for our prototype. We discuss this user interface next.
Figure 2 details the four steps that need to be taken by a user to log in a web
site www.xyz.com.
1. The user ﬁrst enters httpl into the URL box of his browser and pushes
<r e t u r n>; see Figure 4a. This causes a display of the local page httpl to
appear as a small window on the left site of the screen; see Figure 4b.
2. The user enters his username and the name of the site www.xyz.com into
page httpl then clicks on the <s u b m i t>button in this page. This causes
page httpl to execute, update its own display, and send a Hello message
(the ﬁrst message in TLP) to site www.xyz.com which replies by sending
back the web page http://www.xyz.com. This page contains the two ﬁelds,
named nonce and hash, of the Hello-Reply message (the second message in
TLP); see Figure 4c.Pharewell to Phishing 243
3. The user copies the values of the two ﬁelds nonce and hash from the displayed
page http://www.xyz.com and enters them into page httpl. The user then
enters his password into page httpl and clicks on the <s u b m i t>button
of this page. This causes page httpl to execute, update its own display,
and send a Login message (the third message in TLP) to site www.xyz.com
which replies by sending back a new web page http://www.xyz.com.T h i s
new page contains one ﬁeld, named decrypt, of the Login-Reply message (the
last message in TLP); see Figure 4d.
4. The user copies the value of ﬁeld decrypt from the displayed page http://
www.xyz.com and enters it into page httpl. The user then clicks on the
<s u b m i t>button of page httpl. This causes page httpl to execute,
compute the next https page, say page https://online.xyz.com, that needs
to be called into the browser, and redirects the browser to call this page using
TLS and display it on the screen. Note that in this case the browser assigns
the displayed https page a brown classiﬁcation, and so the background color
of the URL box of the displayed page becomes brown as shown in Figure 2e.
Because the browser has classiﬁed the displayed page https://online.xyz.com
brown, then if the user clicks on any link (of an https page) in page https://
online.xyz.com, then the browser will classify the newly called page brown
as well.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a comprehensive proposal to counter human mistakes
and Phishing and Pharming attacks that may occur when a user attempts to log
in a secure web site. Our proposal is based on two ideas. First, we introduce a
new classiﬁcation, brown, of secure https web pages. When the browser of a user
U classiﬁes a displayed page brown, user U should conclude that the displayed
page is secure and can enter his sensitive data into it. Second, we design a new
login protocol, named TLP, that is secure against human mistakes and Phishing
and Pharming attacks. The browser of a user U u s e sT L Pt oc l a s s i f yad i s p l a y e d
page brown according to two rules:
1. The displayed page is called into the browser using TLP.
2. The displayed page is called into the browser, using TLS, from within another
brown page that was displayed earlier on the browser.
Note that TLP is not intended to replace TLS. On the contrary, our vision
assigns complementary roles to be played by TLP and TLS: TLP can be used
ﬁrst to securely log in a web domain, then TLS can be used later to securely go
from one web site to another within the logged in domain.
Note also that some mildly secure web domains may feel that they are in no
danger of facing Phishing or Pharming attacks because adversaries have little
incentive to launch such attacks against these domains. (Examples of such do-
mains are those that host electronic reviewing and handling of submitted papers244 T. Choi et al.
to conferences and journals.) These web domains can keep on employing TLS,
as they do presently, both for logging in a domain and for going from one web
site to another within this domain.
A nice feature of TLP is that a user can use the same username and same
(TLP universal) password to securely log in any web site in the Internet. This
means that the user needs only to memorize one username and one password for
all web sites. Therefore it is reasonable to demand that each user chooses a long
string, say of sixteen characters, to be his TLP universal password. And so TLP
becomes naturally secure against online and oﬄine dictionary attacks.
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